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NOTES
WITHDRAWAL FROM CONSPIRACY:
A CONSTITUTIONAL ALLOCATION OF
EVIDENTIARY BURDENS
INTRODUCTION

Conspiracy, that "elastic, sprawling and pervasive offense,"'
sprawls so wide that the traditional defense to it, withdrawal, usually
results in only partial exoneration for the defendant. The defense is
only complete when coupled with the statute of limitations,2 or when
withdrawal occurs prior to the overt act that completes the conspiracy. 3 The stated policy behind the law's recognition of withdrawal is
to encourage conspirators to weaken the criminal combination by
lessening its numbers, 4 for in numbers is the primary danger of conspiracy: concerted action leading to division of labor,5 efficient organization 6 and the decreased probability of a "change of heart. ' 7 According to the proponents of the group danger rationale, all these
factors make the commission of both the object offense and any related crimes more likely.8

1. Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 445-46 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring). Conspiracy has also been called "that darling of the modern prosecutor's
nursery." Harrison v. United States, 7 F.2d 259, 263 (2d Cir. 1925).
2. United States v. Read, 658 F.2d 1225, 1233 (7th Cir. 1981).
3. United States v. Heckman, 479 F.2d 726, 729 (3d Cir. 1973). See infra note
10.
4. Developments in the Law-CriminalConspiracy, 72 Harv. L. Rev. 920, 957
(1959) [hereinafter cited as Developments]; see Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347,
369-70 (1912) ("[als he has started evil forces he must withdraw his support from
them"); W. LaFave & A. Scott, Handbook on Criminal Law § 65, at 519-20 (1972).
5. W. LaFave & A. Scott, supra note 4, § 61, at 460; see Note, The Conspiracy
Dilemma: Prosecution of Group Crime or Protection of Individual Defendants, 62
Harv. L. Rev. 276, 283-84 (1948) [hereinafter cited as Conspiracy Dilemma].
6. Conspiracy Dilemma, supra note 5, at 283-84.
7. Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587, 593-94 (1961); Developments, supra
note 4, at 924; see Marcus, Conspiracy: The CriminalAgreement in Theory and in
Practice, 65 Geo. L.J. 925, 932-38 (1977); Katz, A Psycho-Analytic Peek at Conspiracy, 20 Buffalo L. Rev. 239, 243 (1970).
8. See Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587, 593-94 (1961); Krulewitch v.
United States, 336 U.S. 440, 448-49 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring); United States v.
Rabinowich, 238 U.S. 78, 88 (1915); United States v. Greer, 467 F.2d 1064, 1071
(7th Cir. 1972); State v. Westbrook, 79 Ariz. 116, 119, 285 P.2d 161, 163 (1954); P.
Marcus, Prosecution and Defense of Criminal Conspiracy Cases § 1.04[3], at 1-21 to
1-25 (1978); Developments, supra note 4, at 924. The group danger rationale is not
universally accepted. See Goldstein, Conspiracy to Defraud the United States, 68
Yale L.J. 405, 414 (1959) ("Though these assumed dangers from conspiracy have a
romantically individualistic ring, they have never been verified empirically."); Johnson, The Unnecessary Crime of Conspiracy, 61 Calif. L. Rev. 1137, 1139 (1973)

WITHDRAWAL FROM CONSPIRACY

The withdrawal defense affords conspirators the opportunity to
reduce the impact of group danger by limiting their liability for
crimes committed by co-conspirators in furtherance of the conspiracy
subsequent to the withdrawal. 9 Otherwise, under the Pinkerton rule,
all co-conspirators would be bound regardless of their knowledge or
participation in those crimes. 10
The withdrawal defense traditionally has been treated as an affirmative defense, and the burden of proving withdrawal has generally

("The law of criminal conspiracy is not basically sound. It should be abolished, not
reformed.").
9. United States v. Read, 658 F.2d 1225, 1232 (7th Cir. 1981); W. LaFave
& A. Scott, supra note 4, § 62, at 487; see United States v. Hickey, 360 F.2d 127, 140
(7th Cir.) (when conspirator enters agreement, he adopts previous acts of co-conspirators), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 928 (1966).
10. Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 647 (1946) ("The criminal intent to
do the act is established by the formation of the conspiracy. Each conspirator
instigated the commission of the crime ....
If [the overt act] can be supplied by the
act of one conspirator, we fail to see why the same or other acts in furtherance of the
conspiracy are likewise not attributable to the others for the purpose of holding them
responsible for the substantive offense."). Although the Model Penal Code disapproves of the rule, and replaces it with normal complicity standards, Model Penal
Code § 2.06 (Proposed Official Draft 1962), many states still retain it. See State v.
Garcia, 117 Ariz. 67, 69, 570 P.2d 1080, 1082 (1977); State v. Logner, 297 N.C. 539,
545, 256 S.E.2d 166, 170 (1979); Commonwealth v. Sullivan, 472 Pa. 129, 159-60,

371 A.2d 468, 482 (1977); Note, Conspiracy: Statutory Reform Since the Model Penal
Code, 75 Colum. L. Rev. 1122, 1149-53 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Statutory Reform]; cf. United States v. Donner, 497 F.2d 184, 192-93 (7th Cir.) (noting the
"continuing viability" of the Pinkerton rule in federal conspiracy law), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 1047 (1974).
Another possible source for the withdrawal defense is the overt act requirement:
If an overt act is required for the prosecution of conspiracy, a defendant who
withdraws before that act is committed may not be punished as a member of the
conspiracy. E.g., United States v. Heckman, 479 F.2d 726, 729 (3d Cir. 1973);
United States v. Beck, 118 F.2d 178, 184 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 587
(1941); see Developments, supra note 4, at 957. This is still the only method of
successfully withdrawing in some states. E.g., Ga. Code Ann. § 26-3202 (Supp.
1982); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-3302 (1981); see Sakv. State, 129 Ga. App. 301, 302, 199
S.E.2d 628, 629 (1973) (affirming defendant's conviction for conspiracy on grounds
that he withdrew after overt act); State v. Daugherty, 221 Kan. 612, 619, 562 P.2d
42, 47 (1977) (citing Kansas statute which provides for this method only); State v.
Baynes, 279 Minn. 423, 425-27, 157 N.W.2d 371, 373 (1968) (holding that every
overt act renews agreement and that liability may be avoided by withdrawing before
overt act). Withdrawal is almost useless in this context, since an overt act requirement may be satisfied by an extremely insignificant act. Thus it is very easy for the
prosecution to prove and very likely to have occurred before withdrawal. P. Marcus,
supra note 8, § 2.08[3], at 2-41; Johnson, supra note 8, at 1142-43; see Braverman v.
United States, 317 U.S. 49, 53 (1942) (overt act need not be a crime); Statutory'
Reform, supra, at 1173-74. This seems to be the reason for extending the defense to
situations in which the particular jurisdiction has no overt act requirement, or when
the defendant withdraws after the overt act is committed. Developments, supra note
4, at 957.
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been on the defendant."I This Note goes beyond the ostensible purpose
of the defense to show that withdrawal is not merely an escape valve,
but rather the logical negation of an element of conspiracy, namely,
membership. The burden of proving withdrawal, therefore, must not

be placed upon the defendant. After a discussion of the operation and

requirements of withdrawal, 12 this Note proceeds to analyze constitu11. E.g., United States v. Diaz, 662 F.2d 713, 716 (11th Cir. 1981); United
States v. Bradsby, 628 F.2d 901, 905 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Borelli, 336
F.2d 376, 388 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 960 (1965). For a full discussion
of the burden of proof on the withdrawal defense, see infra pt. II.
An affirmative defense is one that places the burden of proof (usually by a preponderance of the evidence) on the defendant. See infra note 36 and accompanying text.
The Model Penal Code puts the burden on the prosecution, except when specifically
provided otherwise. Model Penal Code § 1.12 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
12. The Model Penal Code has introduced another defense to conspiracy, renunciation, which requires the defendant to have "thwarted the success of the conspiracy, under circumstances manifesting a complete and voluntary renunciation of his
criminal purpose." Model Penal Code § 5.03(6) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
Withdrawal and renunciation are not, as is often asserted, the same. See W. LaFave
& A. Scott, supra note 4, § 62, at 487-88; P. Marcus, supra note 8, § 2.07, at 2-30
n.8. One difference is immediately apparent: In renunciation, the defendant must
"thwart the success" of the conspiracy. See, e.g., Walker v. Commonwealth, 561
S.W.2d 656, 658 (Ky. 1977) ("sudden loss of fortitude at the final moment of truth" is
not enough); People v. Ozarowski, 38 N.Y.2d 481, 492, 344 N.E.2d 370, 376, 381
N.Y.S.2d 438, 444 (1976) (defendant who "wandered off" in search of a candy store
during object crime did not renounce). Another important difference is that renunciation is a complete defense, relieving liability for all prior involvement in the conspiracy. Note, CriminalAttempt, Conspiracy, and Solicitation under the CriminalCode
Reform Bill of 1978, 47 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 550, 560 n.90 (1979) [hereinafter cited as
Reform Bill]. Unlike withdrawal, renunciation does not start the running of the
statute of limitations. Statutory Reform, supra note 10, at 1168.
A number of states have adopted the renunciation defense. Alaska Stat.
§ 11.16.120 (1980); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-1005 (1978); Ark. Stat. Ann. § 41-710
(1977); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-2-203 (1978); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 53a-48(b) (West
1972); Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 541 (1979); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 777.04(5)(c) (West
1976); Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 705-530 (1976); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 506.060 (BobbsMerrill 1975); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 17-A, § 154(2) (1981); Mo. Ann. Stat. §
564.016 (Vernon 1979); N.Y. Penal Law § 40.10 (McKinney 1975); N.D. Cent. Code
§ 12.1-06-05(3) (1976); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2923.01(I)(1) (Page 1982); Or. Rev.
Stat. § 161.460 (1981); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 18, § 903 (Purdon Supp. 1982-1983); Tex.
Penal Code Ann. § 15.04 (Vernon 1974). The proposed federal criminal code also
adopts the renunciation defense. S. 1630, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. § 1002(b) (1982).
Whether withdrawal is available in those states that have adopted the statutory
renunciation defense is unclear. It probably should be, as it does negate the element
of membership in a conspiracy. See infra text accompanying notes 120-26. The Model
Penal Code does provide for both, Model Penal Code §§ 5.03(6), 5.03(7)(c) (Proposed
Official Draft 1962), and at least one analysis of the proposed federal criminal code
discusses both defenses, but does not make it clear whether the adoption of renunciation precludes withdrawal. See Statutory Reform, supra note 10, at 1175 ("Probably
most legislatures, rightly or not, have regarded the law of withdrawal as reasonably
well established and not in need of codification.").
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•tional aspects of affirmative defenses in general, and applies this
analysis to United States v. Read,' 3 a recent Seventh Circuit decision
which shattered tradition by putting the burden of disproving withdrawal on the prosecution. The Note concludes by examining the
viability of putting only the burden of production on the defendant:
What hardships will the prosecution suffer, how much evidence must
the defendant produce to meet his burden, and how can the constitutional problems related to burden of production, particularly the
denial of the privilege against self-incrimination, be avoided?
I.

WITHDRAWAL GENERALLY

A. Operation
By itself, withdrawal operates as a partial defense. It will not
relieve the defendant of liability for the conspiracy, or for crimes
committed in furtherance of the conspiracy prior to the withdrawal,
but it will exonerate him from subsequent crimes.' 4 Withdrawal may
operate as a complete defense in two situations: 1) when it occurs
before an overt act is committed; 15 or 2) when coupled with the
statute of limitations.' 6 As to the latter,' 7 withdrawal starts the running of the statute as to the withdrawing defendant-he may not be
convicted for conspiracy if the statute has run. 18

13. 658 F.2d 1225 (7th Cir. 1981).
14. Id. at 1232; W. LaFave & A. Scott, supra note 4, § 62, at 486; Rotenberg,
Withdrawalas a Defense to Relational Crimes, 1962 Wis. L. Rev. 596, 604. Because
conspiracy does not merge with the object crime (unlike attempt), a defendant may
be charged with and punished for both. Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587, 593
(1961).
15. See supra note 10.
16. United States v. Read, 658 F.2d 1225, 1233 (7th Cir. 1981).
17. When coupled with the statute of limitations, withdrawal becomes a complete defense owing to the rule that in a conspiracy case, the prosecution must prove
that each defendant was a member at some point during the relevant statutory period
prior to indictment. Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391, 396 (1957); United
States v. Read, 658 F.2d 1225, 1232 (7th Cir. 1981); United States v. Borelli, 336
F.2d 376, 385 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 960 (1965); Ware v. United
States, 154 F. 577, 580 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 207 U.S. 588 (1907).
18. United States v. Read, 658 F.2d 1225, 1233 (7th Cir. 1981); United States v.
Borelli, 336 F.2d 376, 388 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 960 (1965); W.
LaFave & A. Scott, supra note 4, § 62, at 486; Rotenberg, supra note 14, at 604;
Statutory Reform, supra note 10, at 1174; Developments, supra note 4, at 957. The
withdrawal of one defendant does not affect the status of the others. Johnson v.
United States, 62 F.2d 32, 34 (9th Cir. 1932); Wechsler, Jones & Korn, The Treatment of Inchoate Crimes in the Model Penal Code of the American Law Institute:
Attempt, Solicitation, and Conspiracy, 61 Colum. L. Rev. 957, 1015 (1961).
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B. How Withdrawal Is Effected
An early formulation of the requirements for an effective withdrawal was expressed by the Supreme Court in Hyde v. United
States: 19
It requires affirmative action, but certainly that is no hardship.
Having joined in an unlawful scheme, having constituted agents
for its performance, scheme and agency to be continuous until full
fruition be secured, until he does some act to disavow or defeat the
purpose he is in no situation to claim the delay of the law. As the
offense has not been terminated or accomplished he is still offending ....

As he has started evil forces he must withdraw his support

20
from them or incur the guilt of their continuance.

Currently, the basic requirement for withdrawal is timely notification to the co-conspirators or to the police. 2 1 At least one commentator
contends that notification alone is inadequate in that "[i]t is seriously
doubted that the withdrawer can remove from the minds of his coconspirators a germ which he helped plant and nourish." 2 2 In addition, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit has held
19. 225 U.S. 347 (1912).
20. Id. at 369-70. The facts of Hyde clearly illustrate this principle: Defendant
had entered into a land sale fraud scheme, and later voluntarily informed a government agent of the plot. Thus, in Hyde, this voluntary confession to a government
agent would have constituted an effective withdrawal but for the fact that the
defendant committed further overt acts after his disclosure. He therefore did not
withdraw. Id. at 370-72.
21. Fiswick v. United States, 329 U.S. 211, 217 (1946); United States v. Boyd,
610 F.2d 521, 528 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1089 (1980); United States
v. Parnell, 581 F.2d 1374, 1384 (10th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1076 (1979);
United States v. Dorn, 561 F.2d 1252, 1256 (7th Cir. 1977) (per curiam); United
States v. Mardian, 546 F.2d 973, 978 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1976); United States v. Goldberg, 401 F.2d 644, 648-49 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1099 (1969); United
States v. Borelli, 336 F.2d 376, 388 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 960 (1965);
United States v. McGuire, 249 F. Supp. 43, 49 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), aff'd, 381 F.2d 306
(2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1053 (1968); United States v. Gilbert, 31 F.
Supp. 195, 202 (S.D. Ohio 1940); People v. Drake, 151 Cal. App. 2d 28, 34, 310 P.2d
997, 1003 (1957); Loser v. Superior Court, 78 Cal. App. 2d 30, 31, 177 P.2d 320, 321
(1947); People v. Chait, 69 Cal. App. 2d 503, 509, 159 P.2d 445, 451 (1945); People
v. Wallace, 100 Ill. App. 3d 424, 431, 426 N.E.2d 1017, 1023 (1981); Norman v.
State, 381 So. 2d 1024, 1029 (Miss. 1980); Collins v. State, 561 P.2d 1373, 1382
(Okla.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 906 (1977); Commonwealth v. Spriggs, 463 Pa. 375,
380-81, 344 A.2d 880, 883 (1975); Commonwealth v. Griffey, 453 Pa. 142, 146, 307
A.2d 283, 285 (1973); see Alaska Stat. § 11.16.120(1)(C) (1982); Ark. Stat. Ann.
§§ 41-710(2), 41-711 (1977); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-2-204(3) (1973); Me. Rev. Stat.
Ann. tit. 17-A, § 151(6)(B) (1982); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 564.016 (Vernon 1979) (for
statute of limitations purposes only); Model Penal Code § 5.03(7)(c) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
22. Rotenberg, supra note 14, at 604-05. Rotenberg further suggests that withdrawal should be effected by notifying and assisting police in the arrest of coconspirators. Id. at 605.
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that, in special situations, the defendant must not only notify all the
co-conspirators, but also convince them not to continue with the
plan.2 3 This result has been criticized as too stringent, and unjust in
that it "mak[es] the defendant's liability contingent upon the acts of
2 4
others."
The Supreme Court, in an antitrust setting, set out a modern and
broader, more flexible standard in United States v. United States
Gypsum Co. 25 Citing Hyde, the Court held that withdrawal was
established by "[a]ffirmative acts inconsistent with the object of the
conspiracy and communicated in a manner reasonably calculated to
reach co-conspirators. ' 26 This standard is less confining than the more
specific notification requirements of the traditional approach. In fact,
the Gypsum Court found that a jury instruction defining
withdrawal
27
in the traditional, limited language was erroneous.
23. Eldredge v. United States, 62 F.2d 449, 451-52 (10th Cir. 1932). In
Eldredge, the defendants were indicted for conspiring to embezzle funds from a
bank, and conspiring to make false entries in the bank's books to conceal the embezzlement. One defendant claimed that he had withdrawn more than three years
before indictment, and that his prosecution was thus barred by the statute of limitations. To support his claim, the defendant presented evidence that he notified his coconspirators that he would no longer participate in the embezzlement. The court
stated that such notification was enough to effect a withdrawal from the embezzlement aspect of the conspiracy, but that because the conspiracy also included concealment by making false entries, withdrawal could only be effected by persuading the
others not to continue falsifying the books. Id. at 450-52.
24. Developments, supra note 4, at 958-59; see Note, Conspiracy-Application
of Federal Statute of Limitations, 29 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1470, 1473-74 (1954). But see
W. LaFave & A. Scott, supra note 4, § 62, at 486-87 & n.187 (Eldredge result
justified because of "unique facts"-defendant knew others would continue to conceal embezzlement after his withdrawal).
Eldredge was the earliest formulation of the "time bomb" theory: "A declared
intent to withdraw from a conspiracy to dynamite a building is not enough, if the
fuse has been set; he must step on the fuse." 62 F.2d at 451. This theory was
approved without citation in United States v. Borelli, 336 F.2d 376, 388 n.8 (2d Cir.
1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 960 (1965), but rejected in United States v. Lowell, 649
F.2d 950, 959-60 & n.13 (3d Cir. 1981).
25. 438 U.S. 422 (1978).
26. Id. at 464-65 (citing Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347, 369 (1912); United
States v. Borelli, 336 F.2d 376, 388 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 960 (1965);
Developments, supra note 4, at 958).
27. 438 U.S. at 463-65 (1978). The defendants in Gypsum were charged with a
price-fixing conspiracy under § 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976). They
successfully argued that the jury instruction was erroneous because it precluded
consideration of their resumption of competitive behavior as withdrawal. 438 U.S. at
463-65 (1978).
Most federal courts now apply the Gypsum standard to withdrawal. See, e.g.,
United States v. Read, 658 F.2d 1225, 1236 n.8 (7th Cir. 1981); United States v.
Jimenez, 622 F.2d 753, 757-58 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Continental Group,
Inc., 603 F.2d 444, 466-67 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1032 (1980); United
States v. Gillen, 599 F.2d 541, 548 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 950 (1979);
United States v. Richardson, 596 F.2d 157, 163 n.10 (6th Cir. 1979); United States v.
Lowell, 490 F. Supp. 897, 901-02 (D.N.J. 1980), aff'd, 649 F.2d 950 (3d Cir. 1981).
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Despite the inherent flexibility of the Gypsum standard, 28 it does
not give defendants carte blanche to withdraw by sitting back and
doing nothing. "Mere cessation of activity" is not enough to effect a
true withdrawal; 2 9 neither are "hibernation," 30 "turnover [in] person:nel," 31 "laying low" to avoid the police, 32 or non-participation in the
object crime. 33 Yet these descriptions of what withdrawal is not all
reaffirm Hyde's "some act to disavow or defeat the purpose" requirement.3 4 As will be seen later, this same language has long served a
dual purpose-as the substantive definition of the defense, just discussed, and as a procedural mandate to put the burden of proving
35
withdrawal on the defendant.

28. See United States v. Jimenez, 622 F.2d 753, 755 (5th Cir. 1980) ("withdrawal
from a conspiracy may be demonstrated in a variety of ways" (quoting United States
v. Richardson, 596 F.2d 157, 163 n.10 (6th Cir. 1979))).
29. United States v. Phillips, 664 F.2d 971, 1018 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
102 S. Ct. 2965 (1982); United States v. Boyd, 610 F.2d 521, 528 (8th Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1089 (1980); United States v. Continental Group, Inc., 603
F.2d 444, 466 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1032 (1980); United States v.
D'Andrea, 585 F.2d 1351, 1355 n.3 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 983
(1979); United States v. Parnell, 581 F.2d 1374, 1384 (10th Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 1076 (1979); United States v. Dorn, 561 F.2d 1252, 1256 (7th Cir. 1977)
(per curiam); United States v. Dubrin, 93 F.2d 499, 504 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 303
U.S. 646 (1937); see United States v. Lowell, 490 F. Supp. 897, 902 (D.N.J. 1980),
afj'd, 649 F.2d 950 (3d Cir. 1981).
30. United States v. Panebianco, 543 F.2d 447, 453 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 1103 (1977).
31. Id.
32. United States v. Bastone, 526 F.2d 971, 988 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425
U.S. 973 (1976). This points up the requirement that a withdrawal must be made in
good faith. Piquett v. United States, 81 F.2d 75, 81 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 298 U.S.
664 (1936); see United States v. Diaz, 662 F.2d 713, 717 (11th Cir. 1981); United
States v. Read, 658 F.2d 1225, 1239 (7th Cir. 1981); United States v. Continental
Group, Inc., 603 F.2d 444, 466 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1032 (1980);
United States v. Nowak, 448 F.2d 134, 139 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
1039 (1972).
33. United States v. Chester, 407 F.2d 53, 55 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 394 U.S.
1020 (1969). Arrest or incarceration may constitute withdrawal, but this is a jury
question and depends upon the length and location of imprisonment, and the nature
of the conspiracy. United States v. Killian, 639 F.2d 206, 209 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
451 U.S. 1021 (1981); United States v. Panebianco, 543 F.2d 447, 453 (2d Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1103 (1977); United States v. Harris, 542 F.2d 1283, 1301 (7th
Cir. 1976); United States v. Pearson, 508 F.2d 595, 597 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 845 (1975); United States v. Borelli, 336 F.2d 376, 388-90 (2d Cir. 1964), cert.
denied, 379 U.S. 960 (1965); United States v. Agueci, 310 F.2d 817, 838-39 (2d Cir.
1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 959 (1963); Norman v. State, 381 So. 2d 1024, 1029
(Miss. 1980); see United States v. Russano, 257 F.2d 712, 714-16 (2d Cir. 1958)
(conspiracy ended when "core members" of conspiracy were arrested).
34. 225 U.S. at 369.
35. See.infra pt. II.
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WITHDRAWAL: WHOSE BURDEN?

A. The ConstitutionalStandard
Historically, the burden of proving affirmative defenses has been on
the defendant.3 6 At least three justifications for this have been raised.
The first is that defenses traditionally have been considered matters
separate from the elements of a crime.3 7 The prosecution must prove
these elements beyond a reasonable doubt; 38 defenses, however, are a
matter of exception, not negation. Two ancient Roman maxims underlie this theory: ei incumbit probatio qui dicit, non qui negat
(loosely, "the burden of proof is upon the one who asserts, not the one
who denies") and reus excipiendo fit actor (literally, "the defendant,
by excepting, becomes the plaintiff," meaning that defendant bears
the burden of proving his exceptions, just as plaintiff must prove his
own claims) 3 It was therefore long unquestioned that the burden of
proving self-defense or insanity or any other "exception" to criminal
40
liability should be on the defendant.
36. Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 211-12 n.13 (1977); see Osenbaugh,
The Constitutionalityof Affirmative Defenses to Criminal Charges, 29 Ark. L. Rev.
429, 429 (1976); Note, Affirmative Defenses and Due Process: The Constitutionality
of Placing a Burden of Persuasionon a Criminal Defendant, 64 Geo. L.J. 871, 871
(1976) [hereinafter cited as Affirmative Defenses].
37. Fletcher, Two Kinds of Legal Rules: A Comparative Study of Burden-ofPersuasionPractices in Criminal Cases, 77 Yale L.J. 880, 899 (1968); Osenbaugh,
supra note 36, at 440; Affirmative Defenses, supra note 36, at 881.
38. The presumption of innocence is the basis for the reasonable doubt rule. In re
Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363 (1970); Fletcher, supra note 37, at 880-82; Osenbaugh,
supra note 36, at 432-33; Underwood, The Thumb on the Scales of Justice: Burdens
of Persuasion in Criminal Cases, 86 Yale L.J. 1299, 1306-11 (1977).
39. These maxims were civil litigation standards utilized heavily in 19th Century
American criminal cases. Fletcher, supra note 37, at 894-99.
40. See, e.g., Long v. Brewer, 667 F.2d 742, 746-47 (8th Cir. 1982) (intoxication); Brock v. State, 237 Ark. 73, 76, 371 S.W.2d 539, 540-41 (1963) (self-defense);
People v. Monk, 56 Cal. 2d 288, 292, 363 P.2d 865, 869, 14 Cal. Rptr. 633, 637
(1961) (insanity); Quillen v. State, 49 Del. 114, 123, 110 A.2d 445, 449-50 (1955)
(self-defense); State v. Linzmeyer, 248 Iowa 31, 34, 79 N.W.2d 206, 207-08 (1956)
(intoxication); Luttrell v. Commonwealth, 250 Ky. 334, 340-41, 63 S.W.2d 292, 294
(1933) (alibi); State v. Park, 159 Me. 328, 337, 193 A.2d 1, 6 (1963) (insanity); State
v. Quigley, 135 Me. 435, 438, 199 A. 269, 271-72 (1938) (intoxication); Perry v.
State, 234 Md. 48, 52, 197 A.2d 833, 836 (1964) (self-defense); Commonwealth v.
York, 50 Mass. 93, 116 (1845) (provocation); State v. Grainger, 223 N.C. 716, 72223, 28 S.E.2d 228, 231-32 (1943) (self-defense); State v. Kelly, 216 N.C. 627, 649, 6
S.E.2d 533, 546 (1940) (intoxication); Szalkai v. State, 96 Ohio 36, 39, 117 N.E. 12,
13 (1917) (self-defense); State v. Sappienza, 84 Ohio 63, 64, 95 N.E. 381, 382 (1911)
(duress); Commonwealth v. Wilkes, 414 Pa. 246, 249-50, 199 A.2d 411, 413 (selfdefense), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 939 (1964); Commonwealth v. Chapman, 359 Pa.
164, 168, 58 A.2d 433, 435 (1948) (intoxication); State v. Morrison, 121 S.C. 11, 1415, 113 S.E. 304, 303-05 (1922) (same); Thomas v. State, 210 Tenn. 297, 299, 358
S.W.2d 315, 316 (1962) (mitigating circumstances); Wenck v. State, 156 Tex. Crim.
50, 54, 238 S.W.2d 793, 796 (1951) (insanity).
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"Comparative convenience" is a second justification for placing the
burden of proof on the defendant. The defendant, it is said, is usually
in a better position to know and provide evidence concerning the
circumstances of his defense, 4 1 particularly a state-of-mind defense
such as insanity. The Model Penal42Code supports this rationale, but
only in exceptional circumstances.
The "fair compromise" or "gratuitous defense" rationale is the third
justification, used mainly to make the defendant prove new statutory
defenses such as mistake of law. 43 Gratuitous defenses are those that
do not directly negate that which the prosecution must prove. 44 Thus,
such defenses may arguably be eliminated by the legislature. The
legislature graciously allows the defense, and in return the defendant
must prove it by a preponderance of the evidence. 45 Again, this rationale is primarily applied to new defenses; its basis is political. 40 As one
commentator has pointed out:
[I]f the legislature has the power to make a fact irrelevant to guilt,
then the legislature must also have the power to choose its own
rules for proving that fact. In particular, when the law provides a
defense that turns on proof of such a fact, that defense may be
characterized as gratuitous, and therefore exempt from the require47
ment of proof by the government beyond a reasonable doubt.

41. Morrison v. California, 291 U.S. 82, 88-89 (1934); Osenbaugh, supra note
36, at 436-37. But it stands to reason that the defendant will always know more
about his involvement in the crime, so that comparative convenience is an overbroad
justification. See Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463, 469 (1943).
42. Model Penal Code § 1.13 comment, at 113 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955) (giving
example of due diligence to exculpate corporation).
43. Model Penal Code § 2.04 (Proposed Official Draft 1962); Fletcher, supra
note 37, at 928.
44. Underwood, supra note 38, at 1314-15. Alibi has never been considered a
gratuitous defense, because it negates all the elements of a crime; the defendant is
contending that he was not even present at the crime. Affirmative Defenses, supra
note 36, at 886; see Adkins v. Bordenkircher, 674 F.2d 279, 282 (4th Cir. 1982);
Smith v. Smith, 454 F.2d 572, 578 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 885 (1972);
Stump v. Bennett, 398 F.2d 111, 115-16 (8th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
1001 (1968); State v. Grady, 276 Md. 178, 183-84, 345 A.2d 436, 438-39 (1975).
45. Osenbaugh, supra note 36, at 459-60.
46. At least two commentators condemn political manipulation of the burden of
proof:
The legislative instinct for compromise often results in qualified action; and
imposing the burden of persuasion on the defendant is a subtle, inconspicuous way of qualifying a new defense. And the compromise seems harmless.
The defendant has a greater tactical advantage than he had before (there is
an additional issue on which he might be acquitted), so he should not be
heard to complain that the legislature or court is taking away in part that
which they have bestowed on him. Yet a political compromise should be
recognized for what it is. It is not a stand based on principle, on a perception of just policy. It is but a maneuver made for the sake of law reform.
Fletcher, supra note 37, at 928-29; see Osenbaugh, supra note 36, at 459.
47. Underwood, supra note 38, at 1312-13.
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The gratuitous defense rationale is thus nothing more than a politicized version of the separate issue theory. 48 Instead of relying on
ancient civil-law maxims, it finds its raison d'etre in a somewhat
skewed concept of compromise, whereby the legislature49 provides a
defense but in return requires the defendant to prove it.
Selective application of these three theories has justified shifting the
burden of proof to the defendant on just about any defense.50 Early
on, however, common-law courts began to realize the unfairness and
illogic of forcing the defendant to bear the risk of non-persuasion on
certain defenses. 5 ' The landmark case in this respect was Davis v.
United States,52 in which the Supreme Court placed the burden of
disproving insanity in federal cases on the prosecution. In Davis, the
trial court had instructed the jury that the law "presumes every man is
sane, and the burden of showing it is not true is upon the party who
asserts it. ''5 3 The Supreme Court reviewed the similar holdings of
prior insanity-defense cases and rejected the rule:
[T]he crime of murder necessarily involves the possession by the
accused of such mental capacity as will render him criminally
responsible for his acts.
Upon whom then must rest the burden of proving that the
accused, whose life it is sought to take under the forms of law,
belongs to a class capable of committing crime? On principle, it
must rest upon those who affirm that he has committed the crime
for which he is indicted .... [T]o hold that such presumption [of
sanity] must absolutely control the jury until it is overthrown or
impaired by evidence sufficient to establish the fact of insanity
beyond all reasonable doubt or to the reasonable satisfaction of the
jury, is in effect to require him to establish his54innocence, by
proving that he is not guilty of the crime charged.
Unfortunately the Davis Court did not employ constitutional analysis in its opinion. Its sole basis was the reasonable doubt rule, 55 which,

48. See Fletcher, supra note 37, at 928-29; Osenbaugh, supra note 36, at 459-67.
49. The "gratuitous defense" rationale has been roundly condemned by a number of commentators. See, e.g., Fletcher, supra note 37, at 928-29; Osenbaugh, supra
note 36, at 459-67; Underwood, supra note 38, at 1312-30.
50. See Affirmative Defenses, supra note 36, at 886-90.

51. This occurred particularly in the area of insanity. Hopps v. People, 31 Ill.
385, 392-94 (1863); People v. Garbutt, 17 Mich. 9, 22 (1868); State v. Bartlett, 43
N.H. 224, 231 (1861).
52. 160 U.S. 469 (1895).
53. Id. at 476.
54. Id. at 485-87.
55. "[T]he burden of proof... is on the prosecution from the beginning to the
end of the trial and applies to every element necessary to constitute the crime." Id. at
487.
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although fundamental and time-honored,
is not considered to be man6

5
dated by the Constitution.

This failure of the Davis Court to recognize expressly the reasonable
doubt rule as a constitutional guarantee left the states free to impose
the burden of proof of certain defenses on defendants. Thus, in Leland
v. Oregon,57 the Court upheld an Oregon statute requiring the defendant to prove insanity beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court cited
Davis, stating that "[t]he decision [in Davis] obviously establishes no
constitutional doctrine, but only the rule to be followed in federal
courts. As such, the rule is not in question here." 58 The Court went on
to say that it was "reluctant to interfere with Oregon's determination
of its policy with respect to the burden of proof on the issue of sanity
since we cannot say that policy violates generally accepted concepts of
basic standards of justice." 59 Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in a sharp dissent, called the reasonable doubt rule "a requirement and a safeguard
of due process."60

Justice Frankfurter's dissent paved the way for a monumental
about-face by the Court. In re Winship 6' was a juvenile proceeding
case in which the narrow question presented was whether the reasonable doubt rule applied to such a proceeding. The Court concluded
that it did, and firmly announced: "Lest there remain any doubt
about the constitutional stature of the reasonable-doubt standard, we
explicitly hold that the Due Process Clause protects the accused
against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of
every fact62 necessary to constitute the crime with which he is
'

charged."

Five years later the Court put Winship to work. In Mullaney v.
Wilbur,63 it held that a state may not, under the principles enunciated
in Winship, put the burden of proving a defense on the defendant if
that defense negates "the critical fact in dispute."'6 4 Mullaney involved

a Maine statute that defined murder as killing with "malice aforethought," and which defined manslaughter as killing "in the heat of

56. Id. at 487-88; see Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 797 (1952).
57. 343 U.S. 790 (1952).
58. Id. at 797. The aftermath of the "not guilty by reason of insanity" verdict in
the trial of John W. Hinckley, Jr. for the attempted assassination of President Ronald
Reagan has led to a proposal by Senator Strom Thurmond that the burden of proving
insanity be on the defendant, a proposal which would eradicate even Davis' federal
rule. See S.2902, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. § 16(b) (1982).
59. 343 U.S. at 799.
60. Id. at 803 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
61. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
62. Id. at 364.
63. 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
64. Id. at 699-701.
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passion, on sudden provocation."

65

449

The defendant was required to

prove provocation by a preponderance of the evidence in order to
reduce the charge from murder to manslaughter. "Malice aforethought" therefore became a rebuttable presumption.66
In rejecting the Maine scheme, the Court focused on the concept of
blameworthiness and proportionality: 6 7 The difference in punishment
for murder and manslaughter is significant and directly related to the
degree of blameworthiness. That provocation is not a complete defense, ruled the Court, has no bearing on whether it should be proven
by the prosecution or the defense; what is critical is its nature as a
negation of the essential element of malice. The presence of that
element bears directly on the severity of punishment. 6 The Mullaney
Court was also concerned that states might attempt to redefine crimes
to avoid the Winship rule by making certain elements bear on the
extent of punishment rather than on culpability itself: "Winship ' is
69
concerned with substance rather than this kind of formalism."
Moreover, the Court rejected the comparative convenience rationale
as applied to the provocation defense, finding
that disproving it places
"no unique hardship" on the prosecution. 70
Mullaney could be read as condemning as unconstitutional all affirmative defenses. 71 Indeed, that is a fair reading of the case, because
a
any time a defendant is forced to bear the risk of non-persuasion on 72
fact relevant to guilt, the chances of erroneous conviction increase.
The presumption of innocence notwithstanding, many a jury will
entertain the notion that he who is hauled into court must be there for
a reason. The reasonable doubt rule thus lends practical force to the
presumption of innocence; the jury is charged not to convict if it has a
reasonable doubt about the defendant's guilt. The logical extension of
the prosecution's burden to include the disproving of any defense that
tends to negate particular elements of a crime keeps the due process
schema intact.
65. Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 17, §§ 2551, 2651 (repealed 1975); see Note, The

Constitutionalityof Affirmative Defenses after Patterson v. New York, 78 Colum. L.
Rev. 655, 657 n.21 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Constitutionality].
66. 421 U.S. at 686-87. See infra note 173.
67. 421 U.S. at 697-98.
68. Id. at 696-98.
69. Id. at 698-99.
70. Id. at 702 ("[P]roving... provocation is similar to proving any other element of intent; it may be established by adducing evidence of the factual circumstances surrounding the commission of the homicide. And although intent is typically
considered a fact peculiarly within the knowledge of the defendant, this does not, as
the Court has long recognized, justify shifting the burden to him.").
71. See, e.g., Jeffries & Stephan, Defenses, Presumptions, and Burden of Proof in
the Criminal Law, 88 Yale L.J. 1325, 1339-40 & n.40 (1979); Constitutionality,
supra note 65, at 656 & n.8, 659.
72. 421 U.S. at 701.
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Davis was distinguished in Leland, Leland repudiated in Mullaney
via Winship, and Mullaney, in yet another volte-face by the Court,
was "distinguished" in Patterson v. New York. 73 Patterson involved
New York's murder and manslaughter statutes. "Extreme emotional
disturbance" (the equivalent of provocation) is characterized as an
affirmative defense to murder, but the statute goes on to provide that
"[n]othing contained in this paragraph shall constitute a defense to a
prosecution for, or preclude a conviction of, manslaughter." 74 The
manslaughter statute then defines that crime as an intentional killing
75
carried out "under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance.
The trial court in Patterson had instructed the jury that as to the
murder charge, the defendant had the burden of proving the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance by a preponderance of
the evidence. 76 Clearly this was another Mullaney-same crime, same
defense, same burden of proof. But the Mullaney scare had set in:
Were all affirmative defenses unconstitutional? 77 How far could federal courts interfere with state criminal law policy? 78 Would the states
merely eliminate defenses if they could not put the burden on the
defendant? 79 Would state-law reform be stifled because the legislature
could not offset new and possibly controversial defenses with a burden
shift? 80 These were the spoken and unspoken concerns of the Patterson
Court, 8' and so to restrain the sprawling consequences of Mullaney,

73. 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
74. N.Y. Penal Law § 125.25 (McKinney 1975).
75. Id. § 125.20(2).
76. 432 U.S. at 200.
77. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
78. See Allen, Mullaney v. Wilbur, the Supreme Court, and the Substantive
CriminalLaw-An Examination of the Limits of Legitimate Intervention, 55 Tex.
L. Rev. 269, 275-76 (1977) ("[T]he elimination of affirmative defenses . . .would
entail an intervention by the federal judiciary into the substantive criminal law of the
states more massive than the present Court seems likely to permit.") [hereinafter
cited as Allen I].
79. Allen, The Restoration of In re Winship: A Comment on Burdens of Persuasion in Criminal Cases after Patterson v. New York, 76 Mich. L. Rev. 30, 50 (1977)
(discussing the political compromise test as a response to this fear) [hereinafter cited
as Allen II].
80. Constitutionality, supra note 65, at 671 ("States may be willing to attempt
reform only if they are allowed to cushion the impact of new defenses by shifting the
burden of persuasion.").
81. The Patterson Court justified its conclusion thus:
The Due Process Clause, as we see it, does not put New York to the choice of
abandoning those defenses or undertaking to disprove their existence in
order to convict of a crime which otherwise is within its constitutional
powers to sanction by substantial punishment .... To recognize at all a
mitigating circumstance does not require the State to prove its nonexistence
in each case in which the fact is put in issue, if in its judgment this would be
too cumbersome, too expensive, and too inaccurate.
432 U.S. at 207-09; see Constitutionality,supra note 65, at 661-62.
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the Court "distinguished" it and upheld the New York law.8 2 In
Mullaney, the Court explained, malice was presumed; nothing was
presumed against the defendant in Patterson.8 3
This strained reasoning does exactly what the Mullaney Court
sought to prevent: It focuses on the form of the statute rather than the
substance. Was Pattersonthen a repudiation of Mullaney? On its face,
Patterson actually approved Mullaney, but refused to give it broad
application. 84 Furthermore, on the same day the Patterson decision
85
was handed down, the Court decided Hankerson v. North Carolina,

a self-defense case that held that Mullaney must be applied retroactively, because "the major purpose of the constitutional standard of
proof beyond a reasonable doubt ... was to overcome an aspect of8 a6
criminal trial that substantially impairs the truth-finding function.
Mullaney is no spent force, but certainly not the force it could have

been.
Most courts consider Winship, Mullaney and Patterson an inseparable trio which, notwithstanding the inconsistencies of the latter two,
stand for the proposition that a defense that negates an element of the
crime must be disproven by the prosecution beyond a reasonable
doubt.8 7 One such court was the Seventh Circuit, which, applying
Winship, Mullaney and Pattersonin United States v. Read,8 8 held that
withdrawal negates the membership element of conspiracy and therefore must be disproven by the prosecution.8 9 Read has important
implications for conspiracy prosecutions and for defenses in general,

82. 432 U.S. at 215-16. Patterson revived the separate issue theory. Once death,
intent and causation are shown, the state has satisfied its burden and the defendant
must then prove his mitigating circumstances. Id. at 205-06.
83. Id. at 215-16.
84. Id. at 214-15. One commentator, however, states quite plainly that Patterson
overruled Mullaney, appearances to the contrary notwithstanding. Allen II, supra
note 79, at 53-54.
85. 432 U.S. 233 (1977).
86. Id. at 241 (quoting Ivan V. v. City of New York, 407 U.S. 203, 204-05
(1972), which applied Winship retroactively to juvenile proceedings).
87. Guthrie v. Warden, 683 F.2d 820, 824-26 (4th Cir. 1982) (intoxication, heat
of passion, self-defense); Adkins v. Bordenkircher, 674 F.2d 279, 282 (4th Cir. 1982)
(alibi); Tennon v. Ricketts, 642 F.2d 161, 164 (5th Cir. 1981) (self-defense); Holloway v. McElroy, 632 F.2d 605, 620-24 (5th Cir. 1980) (same), cert. denied, 451 U.S.
1028 (1981); State v. Rice, 379 A.2d 140, 145 (Me. 1977) (involuntary intoxication);
In re John Doe, 390 A.2d 920, 926 (R.I. 1978) (self defense); see Long v. Brewer, 667
F.2d 742, 746-47 (8th Cir. 1982) (relying on Pattersonto put the burden of proof on
the defendant for intoxication). The Long court admitted difficulty reconciling
Mullaney and Patterson, but quoted Holmes: "The life of the law has not been logic;
it has been experience." Id. at 747 (quoting O.W. Holmes, The Common Law 1

(1881)).
88. 658 F.2d 1225 (7th Cir. 1981).
89. Id. at 1233.
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particularly those that do not obviously negate an element of the
crime.
B. Withdrawal: Shifting the Burden to the Prosecution
In Read, a defendant who was indicted for federal mail and securities fraud conspiracy claimed that he withdrew from the conspiracy
more than five years before his indictment, and that therefore his
prosecution was barred by the statute of limitations.90 The trial judge
instructed the jury on the Gypsum requirements of withdrawal, 91 but
did not instruct that the government bears the burden of disproving
withdrawal beyond a reasonable doubt. The trial court thus imposed
on the defendant the burden of proof.
The Seventh Circuit construed the federal conspiracy statute 2 as
requiring proof of three elements: the existence of the conspiracy, an
overt act and membership of the defendant.9 3 The prosecution must
further prove that membership existed at some point during the five
years preceding the indictment; if not, conviction is barred by the
statute of limitations.9 4 Because withdrawal negates the essential element of membership during the statutory period, under Winship,
Mullaney and Patterson, the prosecution must disprove it.9 5
The Read court acknowledged the nearly unanimous view that the
burden of proving withdrawal is on the defendant, a proposition
which found its roots in Hyde v. United States.9 Before Hyde, however, courts had held that the government had to prove membership
during the statutory period:9 7 "Put another way, the government had
to prove that each defendant had not withdrawn prior to the running
of the statute of limitations." '9 8 Hyde did not change this, but merely
set a substantive standard ("some act to disavow or defeat the pur90. Id. at 1231. The federal statute of limitations is five years. 18 U.S.C. § 3282
(1976).
91. 658 F.2d at 1231. See supra text accompanying notes 25-26.
92. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1976).
93. 658 F.2d at 1232.
94. Id. (citing Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391, 396 (1957); United
States v. Borelli, 336 F.2d 376, 389 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 960
(1965)).
95. 658 F.2d at 1232-33.
96. 225 U.S. 347, 369 (1912). The "some act to disavow or defeat the purpose"
language in Hyde has been interpreted by most courts to put the burden of proving
withdrawal on defendant. E.g., United States v. Bradsby, 628 F.2d 901, 905 (5th
Cir. 1980); United States v. Jimenez, 622 F.2d 753, 757-58 (5th Cir. 1980); United
States v. Krasn, 614 F.2d 1229, 1236 (9th Cir. 1980).
97. Ware v. United States, 154 F. 577, 579 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 207 U.S. 588
(1907).
98. United States v. Read, 658 F.2d 1225, 1233 (7th Cir. 1981) (emphasis in
original).
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pose") 99 for the defense, and required the defendant to come forward
with evidence to disprove his membership. Save for two early decisions, however, 00 all courts since Hyde have construed this language
to mandate the placing of the burden of proof on the defendant,' 01 an
interpretation that the Read court found erroneous. 102 It explained
that the "some act" requirement of Hyde puts merely the burden of
production, not persuasion, on the defendant.
Indeed, there is nothing in Hyde to suggest that the burden of proof
was on the defendant. The term "burden of proof" does not appear in
the opinion. Again, what Hyde was really concerned with was a
substantive standard for withdrawal, which would naturally require
a burden of production to show defendant's compliance with the
standard.
The defendants in Hyde contended that the statute of limitations
begins to run from the last overt act, and that the government must
prove each defendant's "conscious participation" in the conspiracy
throughout the statutory period. 0 3 The Court noted, however, that in
a continuous conspiracy, one which contemplates a series of acts over
a number of years, any conspiratorial act should trigger the statute of
limitations, and subsequent "conscious participation" is deemed irrel99. 225 U.S. at 369.
100. Mansfield v. United States, 76 F.2d 224, 229-30 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 296
U.S. 601 (1935); Buhler v. United States, 33 F.2d 382, 385 (9th Cir. 1929). See infra
Pt. III.
101. United States v. Nicoll, 664 F.2d 1308, 1315 n.6 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 102
S. Ct. 2929 (1982); United States v. Diaz, 662 F.2d 713, 717 (11th Cir. 1981); United
States v. Killian, 639 F.2d 206, 209 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1021 (1981);
United States v. Bradsby, 628 F.2d 901, 905 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v.
Jimenez, 622 F.2d 753, 757 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Krasn, 614 F.2d 1229,
1236 (9th Cir. 1980); United States v. Boyd, 610 F.2d 521, 528 (8th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 1089 (1980); United States v. James, 609 F.2d 36, 41 (2d Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 445 U.S. 905 (1980); United States v. Gillen, 599 F.2d 541, 548 (3d Cir.
1979); United States v. Parnell, 581 F.2d 1374, 1384 (10th Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 1076 (1979); United States v. Dorn, 561 F.2d 1252, 1256 (7th Cir. 1977);
United States v. Pearson, 508 F.2d 595, 597 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 845
(1975); United States v. Heckman, 479 F.2d 726, 729 (3d Cir. 1973); United States v.
Cirillo, 468 F.2d 1233, 1239 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 989 (1973);
United States v. Chester, 407 F.2d 53, 55 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 1020
(1969); United States v. Goldberg, 401 F.2d 644, 648 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
393 U.S. 1099 (1969); United States v. Borelli, 336 F.2d 376, 388 (2d Cir. 1964), cert.
denied, 379 U.S. 960 (1965); United States v. Cianchetti, 315 F.2d 584, 589 (2d Cir.
1963); United States v. Stromberg, 268 F.2d 256, 263 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 361
U.S. 863 (1959); United States v. Beck, 118 F.2d 178, 184-85 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
313 U.S. 587 (1941); United States v. RoUnick, 91 F.2d 911, 918 (2d Cir. 1937);
Marino v. United States, 91 F.2d 691, 695 (9th Cir. 1937), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 764
(1938); Coates v. United States, 59 F.2d 173, 174 (9th Cir. 1932); United States v.
Lowell, 490 F. Supp. 897, 901-02 (D.N.J. 1980), aff'd, 649 F.2d 950 (3d Cir. 1981);
United States v. Gilbert, 31 F. Supp. 195, 202 (S.D. Ohio 1939); Norman v. State,
381 So. 2d 1024, 1029 (Miss. 1980).
102. 658 F.2d at 1233-36.
103. 225 U.S. at 368.

454

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51

evant. Thus, the running of the statute should not depend on a single
defendant's conscious participation at one fixed time. 104 This rule does
not take away the power to withdraw; it only means that a defendant
must have taken an affirmative step to withdraw. He cannot withdraw merely by ceasing to be active in the conspiracy. 10 5 The Court
did not repudiate, or even discuss, the prior law, which specifically
put the burden of proving membership at some point in the statutory
period on the prosecution. 0 6
Read leaves open the question of whether withdrawal as a partial
defense-when not combined with the statute of limitations-is subject to the same analysis. Withdrawal does negate the element of
membership for statute of limitations purposes. It remains to be demonstrated, however, that withdrawal also negates membership for the
purposes of determining liability for subsequent crimes committed by
co-conspirators in furtherance of the conspiracy.
C. Beyond Read
Given its history, the withdrawal defense is not easy to conceptualize as the negation of an element of a crime. Arguably, its status as a
"policy" defense precludes the idea that it has anything to do with
culpability. The concept of culpability is fundamental to criminal
law. 107 This is not a statement of the obvious, for it is often overlooked
when questions of defenses and burden of proof arise.' 08 The purpose
of a criminal trial is to determine whether the defendant is properly
subject to punishment ' 0 9-whether his act is blameworthy. As one
commentator stated: "Men may not be sacrificed arbitrarily for the
social good; there must be some reasons for selecting some and not
others." 1,0

104. Id. at 369.
105. Id.
106. See Ware v. United States, 154 F. 577, 579-80 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 207
U.S. 588 (1907). See supra text accompanying notes 96-99.
107. Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 803 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting);
Morrissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250-52 (1952); Jeffries & Stephan, supra
note 71, at 1371-72.
108. See Jeffries & Stephan, supra note 71, at 1347 ("The trouble lies in trying to
define justice in exclusively procedural terms. [The] preference for letting the guilty
go free rather than risking conviction of the innocent . . . cannot be implemented by
a purely procedural concern with burden of proof. Guilt and innocence are substantive concepts. . . . A constitutional policy to minimize the risk of convicting the
may constitute
'innocent'
,guilt.' "). must be grounded in a constitutional conception of what
109. Fletcher, supra note 37, at 888.
110. Id. at 890; see Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 803 (1952) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting); Jeffries & Stephan, supra note 71, at 1371-72.
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Primary among these reasons is moral blameworthiness, and it is
reflected in the elements of the crime.' The prosecution must prove
such elements-must prove blameworthiness-beyond a reasonable
doubt. It logically follows that if a defense negates an element,
thereby negating blameworthiness, the prosecution must disprove it.
The prosecution cannot possibly meet its burden if it does not do so.
But, the argument goes, if a defense is based on policy, or hinges
upon a procedural device such as the statute of limitations, it is
unrelated to blameworthiness and therefore is not a negation of an
element." 2 This could be said of the withdrawal defense, for the
defendant, having joined the conspiracy, is already culpable. If he
seeks to escape liability via the statute of limitations, he has not raised
an issue relevant to guilt or innocence in the abstract sense of those
terms; the statute of limitations is a housekeeping device, a matter of
procedure, a "technicality.""13 If he is trying to limit his liability for
his co-conspirators' crimes through a withdrawal defense, he is again
already culpable, although within a policy of gratuitous partial forgiveness, and is eligible for a reward for weakening the criminal
combination. "14
This view of the withdrawal defense turns it into a separate issue, or
even a gratuitous defense," 5 thus requiring the defendant to shoulder
the burden of proof. But it is an incorrect and unjust view. Distinguishing betveen blameworthiness in the abstract and guilt, therefore
punishment, in practice, makes no sense." 6 In other words, it should
make no difference that the statute of limitations is merely a procedural device that makes withdrawal a complete defense. Nor does it
matter that withdrawal itself is merely a policy defense. Policy and
procedure may be unrelated to abstract blameworthiness, but they

111. The existence of strict liability crimes, such as statutory rape, indicates that
moral blameworthiness is not always a justification for punishment. Such crimes,
however, are generally limited to regulatory or public welfare offenses, in which the
state has a compelling interest (e.g., the protection of children), and generally carry
lesser penalties. Jeffries & Stephan, supra note 71, at 1373-76; see, e.g., N.Y. Penal
Law §§ 70.00(2)(e), 130.25 (McKinney 1975) (statutory rape a class E felony with a
maximum sentence of four years imprisonment).
112. Osenbaugh, supra note 36, at 459-60, 467. Fletcher rejects the notion that a
policy defense is unrelated to blameworthiness, Fletcher, supra note 37, at 928, but
accepts the argument as it applies to the statute of limitations. Id. at 921-22.
113. Osenbaugh, supra note 36, at 467. The burden of proving that the statute has
not run is on the prosecution. Fletcher, supra note 37, at 922.
114. Cf. Constitutionality, supra note 65, at 678 (discussing the conceptually
similar defense of abandonment of an attempt).
115. See supra text accompanying notes 37-40 & 43-49.
116. See Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 697-98 (1975) ("[T]he criminal
law ...is concerned not only with guilt or innocence in the abstract but also with
the degree of criminal culpability. . . .Because [those who kill in the heat of passion]
are less 'blameworth[y],' . . . they are subject to substantially less severe penalties.").
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can, in practice, mean the difference between punishment and freedom. Accordingly, they become elements of the crime. If the policy

behind the withdrawal defense is to reward defendants who weaken
the group by allowing them to limit their guilt, then that policy is
related to blameworthiness: The defendant is no longer blameworthy7
for the crimes of his confederates committed after his withdrawal."
He can be punished for them only if he was still a conspirator when
they were committed. Similarly, he cannot be punished if the statute
has run; he must have been a member of the conspiracy during the
statutory period." 8 The elements of conspiracy are not just those
related to blameworthiness, but also those related to the ability to
punish. Blameworthiness and punishment are inseparable." 9
The argument remains that if the state were forced to bear the
burden on certain defenses, it would do better to eliminate them
altogether, either explicitly or by redefining the elements of the

crime. 20 In the case of withdrawal, elimination seems possible. In
such event, the statute of limitations would begin to run only when

117. See Rotenberg, supra note 14, at 599-602 (discussing withdrawal from inchoate crimes in light of theories of punishment: "If the offender withdrew because
he realized that what he was doing was wrong .. then punishment based on
reformation or deterrence is superfluous.").
118. See Wechsler, Jones & Korn, supra note 18, at 1017 ("As a general matter,
the policy behind statutes of limitation dictates that they should begin to run when
an individual's criminal conduct ends. If the crime is conspiracy, this conduct theoretically ends when he ceases to agree in the purpose [of the conspiracy].").
119. This is a fundamental criminal law concept which is more often assumed
than explicitly stated. See J. Andanaes, Punishment and Deterrence 164 (1974)
("[C]riminal law is greatly concerned with punishing only the really blameworthy.
The law requires a voluntary act, a guilty mind, and a responsible person. If these
requirements are not met, punishment is not considered proper."); M. Foucault,
Discipline and Punish 89-90 (1977) (likening crime to a breach of the social contract,
which justifies punishment in order to defend society); Fletcher, supra note 37, at 888
(stating that the task in criminal trials is to determine whether the use of the state's
"coercive powers" is justified, and that blameworthiness is the key concern in that
determination).
One work discusses the felony-murder rule, which punishes as murder any homicide committed in the course of the felony without proof of specific intent:
Because the felony-murder rule requires no proof of culpability with respect
to the homicide, it would be condemned as an impermissible imposition of
penal liability without proof of fault. It would therefore be held unconstitutional, either as an unjustified invasion of that substantive liberty guaranteed by the due process clause or as a cruel and unusual punishment violative of the Eighth Amendment. This line of analysis necessarily would
condemn every application of the felony-murder rule, for no matter how
heinous the underlying offense, the additional penalty imposed for homicide
would lack any independent basis in the proved blameworthiness of the
accused.
Jeffries & Stephan, supra note 71, at 1383-84.
120. See Jeffries & Stephan, supra note 71, at 1347.
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the entire conspiracy terminated,121 or when the last overt act was
committed.12 2 Every defendant would be charged with every crime
committed by co-conspirators in furtherance of the conspiracy.
The answer to this argument lies in the rationale for conspiracy
itself. A criminal agreement is punishable because of the particular
danger posed when two or more people join forces to commit a
crime.12 3 Yet this does not support subjecting a defendant to cumulative punishment if he has in good faith ceased to aid the group. Thus,
no justification exists for holding him liable for crimes committed
subsequent to withdrawal. Withdrawal is therefore a logically necessary defense.
When withdrawal is coupled with the statute of limitations, different reasoning applies, but the same result should obtain. The prosecution has always had to prove the defendant's membership during the
statutory period. 2 4 Even if the defense of withdrawal were eliminated
it would strain logic to claim that the defendant was still a member if
he had in fact repudiated the enterprise. Withdrawal in this situation
even more clearly negates membership.
The question of proportionality also comes into play here, at least
for withdrawal as a partial defense. The substantive rule imposing
criminal liability for all crimes committed by co-conspirators in the
furtherance of a single underlying offense itself presents the question
whether the cumulative punishment goes too far beyond the proven
blameworthiness of the defendant. 25 Given that the conspiracy itself
is a sufficient basis for that punishment, the rule makes crimes committed by co-conspirators strict liability offenses which require no
independent mens rea or actus reus. If withdrawal is eliminated as a
defense, there would be no relief even for a defendant who attempts
to prevent, by withdrawing, the very crimes for which he is deemed
responsible. Such a result is intolerable given that the Pinkerton rule is
already overbroad. 1 26 These are several good reasons why withdrawal
should not in fairness be eliminated, when, because it cannot shift the
burden of proof to defendant, a legislature has it in mind to do so.

121. See W. LaFave & A. Scott, supra note 4, § 62, at 482-83.
122. See Fiswick v. United States, 329 U.S. 211, 216 (1946).
123. See supra text accompanying notes 4-8.

124. Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391, 396 (1957); United States v.
Read, 658 F.2d 1225, 1232 (7th Cir. 1981); Ware v. United States, 154 F. 577, 57980 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 207 U.S. 588 (1907).
125. Jeffries & Stephan, supra note 71, at 1384-85.
126. See Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 647 (1946); Statutory Reform,
supra note 10, at 1150; Developments, supra note 4, at 993-1000; Note, Vicarious
LiabilityforCriminal Offenses of Co-Conspirators,56 Yale L.J. 371, 378 (1947) ("In
the final analysis the Pinkerton decision extends the wide limits of the conspiracy
doctrine to the breaking-point and opens the door to possible new abuses by overzealous public prosecutors.").
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One of the Mullaney Court's concerns about burden-shifting defenses was that the chance of an erroneous conviction is increased
when a defendant is forced to bear the burden of proof on an issue
negating part of the prosecution's case.127 This is particularly true of
the withdrawal defense. The following example is illustrative: A, B
and C agree to rob a bank. After A buys the gun and definite plans are
drawn up, he has a change of heart and decides that in good conscience he cannot go through with the scheme. He tells this to B and
C, and after unsuccessfully trying to convince them to abandon the
conspiracy, he leaves, taking the gun with him in the hope that this
will hinder their efforts. B and C nevertheless go ahead with the plan,
rob the bank, and in the process kill a teller. B and C are arrested and
charged with conspiracy, robbery and murder. During their interrogation they implicate A, taking revenge. A is arrested and charged
with all three crimes. At trial, B and C refuse to take the stand on fifth
amendment grounds. A knows that the evidence against him for
conspiracy is overwhelming, and so he decides to testify, admitting his
participation but claiming that his withdrawal exonerates him from
the robbery and murder charges. His own testimony is the only evidence he has, because of B and C's unwillingness to testify. The court
instructs the jury as to the elements and consequences of withdrawal,
and further charges that in order to acquit A of the substantive
offenses on the basis of an effective withdrawal, the jury must be
"satisfied" (the preponderance standard) that A did indeed withdraw.
The jury is also told that nonparticipation in the object crime is not,
by itself, enought to constitute withdrawal.
The jury may of course be "satisfied" by A's testimony, and acquit
him; but it may also convict him on his own slim evidence. But if the

127. 421 U.S. at 701. The Mullaney Court quoted Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S.
513, 525-26 (1958): "[W]here one party has at stake an interest of transcending
value-as a criminal defendant his liberty-th[e] margin of error is reduced as to him
by the process of placing on the [prosecution] the burden . . . of persuading the
factfinder at the conclusion of the trial." The Winship Court also quoted Speiser. In
re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). The fear of erroneous convictions finds its
origin in the maxim that it is better to acquit five guilty men than to convict one
innocent man. M. Hale, Pleas of the Crown 289 (1694), cited in Fletcher, supra note
37, at 881 n.7; see Ashford & Risinger, Presumptions,Assumptions, and Due Process
in Criminal Cases: A Theoretical Overview, 79 Yale L.J. 165, 186 (1969) ("The
governmental interest in acquitting the innocent cannot be subordinated to its interest in convicting the guilty.").
It should be noted that the withdrawal defense comports with Patterson's"presumption" requirement, see supra text accompanying note 83, because a conspiracy is
presumed to continue as to each defendant until the contrary is shown. Hyde v.
United States, 225 U.S. 347, 369 (1912); United States v. Stromberg, 268 F.2d 256,
263 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 863 (1959); Marino v. United States, 91 F.2d
691, 695 (9th Cir. 1937), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 764 (1938).
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jury is charged that A must only raise a reasonable doubt 12 as to
withdrawal, and that the prosecution must disprove A's claim beyond
a reasonable doubt, the chance that A will be convicted wrongly is
reduced considerably, if not eliminated altogether.
It is all very well to speak of "compromise" when arguing that
shifting the burden to the defendant on withdrawal is proper, but so
many procedural advantages adhere to the prosecution in a conspiracy trial that the burden shift is doubly unfair. Conviction for conspiracy is facilitated by a co-conspirator hearsay exception, 2 9 joint trials, 1 30 broad venue rules13 ' and generous use of circumstantial
evidence.1 32 Defendants in conspiracy trials are already at a great
disadvantage. How much further may the scales be tipped in favor of
the prosecution?
III. THE BURDEN OF PRODUCTION:
A WORKING CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARD

Part of the Mullaney rationale for putting the burden of disproving
a defense on the prosecution was that the burden posed "no unique
hardship" for the prosecution. Disproof of the defense can be accomplished through evidence of the circumstances of the crime. 33 Concededly, however, it would be an insurmountable hardship to require
the prosecution to disprove the existence of every possible defense to
the crime. The defendant, therefore, in order to raise the issue, must
at least bear the burden of producing evidence of his particular de34

fense. 1

128. This is a burden of production standard, see infra pt. III, which is much
lower than the preponderance standard for the burden of proof. Ashford & Risinger,
supra note 127, at 174.
129. Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E); N.Y. Code of Evid. § 803(b)(5) (N.Y.S. Law
Revision Comm'n Proposed 1982); see W. LaFave & A. Scott, supra note 4, § 61, at
457.
130. United States v. Kelly, 569 F.2d 928, 938 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
829 (1978); Fed. R. Crim. P. 8(b); W. LaFave & A. Scott, supra note 4, § 61, at 458.
Joint trials present the danger that the jury will find a defendant guilty by association, rather than individually. Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 772-74
(1946).
131. Venue may be proper wherever any overt act was committed, which could
violate the sixth amendment's mandate that "the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the
crime shall have been committed." U.S. Const. amend. VI; W. LaFave & A. Scott,
supra note 4, § 61, at 456.
132. W. LaFave & A. Scott, supra note 4, § 61, at 457-58.
133. Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 702 (1975).
134. See, e.g., Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469, 486 (1895) (insanity); United
States v. Wolffs, 594 F.2d 77, 80 (5th Cir. 1979) (entrapment); United States v.
Smith, 532 F.2d 158, 161 (10th Cir. 1976) (duress); Gales v. State, 338 So. 2d 436,
438 (Ala. Crim. App.) (insanity), cert. denied, 338 So. 2d 438 (Ala. 1976); People v.
Manson, 61 Cal. App. 3d 102, 203-06, 132 Cal. Rptr. 265, 327-29 (1976) (diminished
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As to the withdrawal defense, Read explicitly interpreted Hyde's
"some act" requirement as putting the burden of production on the
defendant 135 and held that to be the proper standard. 1 6 But the
inquiry must not end there. Neither Read nor Hyde specifies exactly
how much evidence the defendant must produce. 37 In addition, constitutional problems inhere in compelling a defendant to come forward with evidence.
A. General Standards
The burden of production is a threshold requirement for getting an
issue to the jury. 13 The judge determines whether the burden has
been met. If it has not, he will not instruct the jury on the issue, and
the opposing party need not present evidence negating it. 13
Three standards exist for the amount of evidence necessary to meet
the defendant's burden of production: 1) "any evidence"; 2) "more
than a scintilla" of evidence; and 3) evidence that raises a reasonable
doubt about the element of the crime to be negated. 140 For example,
in Zemina v. Solem,' 4 1 the court applied the "any evidence" standard
to the issue of self-defense, stating that "a defendant has a right to
have his theory presented in the instructions '[e]ven when the supporting evidence is weak or of doubtful credibility.' ",142 The rationale

capacity and duress), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 986 (1977); People v. Wurbs, 38 Ill.
App. 3d 360, 364-65, 347 N.E.2d 879, 883 (1976) (entrapment); People v. Wells, 30
Ill. App. 3d 968, 968, 333 N.E.2d 496, 497 (1975) (per curiam) (insanity); Commonwealth v. Kennedy, 4 Mass. App. Ct. 772, 773, 341 N.E.2d 697, 698-99 (1976)
(duress); see Fletcher, supra note 37, at 908; Underwood, supra note 38, at 1334-36;
Affirmative Defenses, supra note 36, at 885. The Court in Mullaney noted that its
decision did not affect the imposition of a burden of production on defendant. 421
U.S. at 701 n.28.
135. 658 F.2d at 1233; see id. at 1236 n.8 ("The import of our decision is that the
showing is only one of production, not persuasion.").
136. Id. at 1236.
137. Id. at 1234 ("Hyde said nothing explicit about the amount of evidence the
defendant must offer" (emphasis in original)).
138. J. Thayer, A Preliminary Treatise on Evidence at the Common Law 355-59
(1898); Allen, StructuringJury Decisionmakingin CriminalCases: A Unified Constitutional Approach to Evidentiary Devices, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 321, 327-28 (1980)
[hereinafter cited as Allen III]; Underwood, supra note 38, at 1335.
139. Allen III, supra note 138, at 329 (pointing out that this is the equivalent of
directing a verdict on the issue).
140. Id. at 328-29.
141. 438 F. Supp. 455 (D.S.D. 1977), aff'd, 573 F.2d 1027 (8th Cir. 1978).
142. Id. at 468 (quoting United States v. Garner, 529 F.2d 962, 970 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 426 U.S. 922 (1976)); see United States ex. rel. Means v. Solem, 480 F.
Supp. 128, 134 (D.S.D. 1979) (citing Zemina), aJJ'd, 646 F.2d 322 (8th Cir. 1980).
The Zemina court found that the evidence was more than sufficient for an instruction
on self-defense, based on the defendant's and medical expert's testimony that the
victim had assaulted the defendant. 438 F. Supp. at 468.

19821

WITHDRAWAL FROM CONSPIRACY

behind this is that "[i]t is not for the trial judge to assess the credibility
of witnesses, to resolve conflicts
in testimony or to weigh the evidence
43
as these are jury functions."
The "more than a scintilla" standard is not significantly higher than
"any evidence." In United States v. Timberlake,144 an entrapment
case, the court held that the defendant must produce "more than a
scintilla" of evidence, but that such evidence could be weak, inconsistent or even insufficiently probative, as the question of credibility is
one for the jury. 145 Similarly, in United States v. Wolffs, 146 another
entrapment case, the court stated that the defendant had to produce
"more than a scintilla" of evidence, and that a court should view the
testimony in the light most favorable to the defendant in deciding
whether the burden has been met.1 47 The Wolffs court suggested also
that the prosecution's own evidence may itself satisfy the defendant's
14
burden.
Credibility, then, is not a major concern of those courts that employ
the "any evidence" or "more than a scintilla" standards. As long as
something somewhere suggests that the issue exists, the defendant can,
if he requests, get an instruction on it.
On the other hand, the "raise a reasonable doubt" standard, the
highest of the three

49

and the most commonly employed,1

50

does

necessitate a preliminary inquiry into credibility. The judge determines whether the jury could find that the defendant's evidence raises
a reasonable doubt, not just any doubt.' 5' In State v. Rice, 52 the
Maine Supreme Court relied on Mullaney and Winship to put the
burden of disproving involuntary intoxication on the prosecution, and
held that defendant must produce enough evidence to generate the
issue by raising a reasonable doubt. 153 The "raise a reasonable doubt"
143. United States v. Beran, 546 F.2d 1316, 1320 n.5 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
430 U.S. 916 (1977).
144. 559 F.2d 1375 (5th Cir. 1977).
145. Id. at 1379.
146. 594 F.2d 77 (5th Cir. 1979).
147. Id. at 80.
148. Id.
149. Allen III, supra note 138, at 328-29.
150. Id. at 329.
151. See State v. Millett, 273 A.2d 504, 508 (Me. 1971) (substantial evidence);
State v. Johnson, 579 S.W.2d 771, 776 (Mo. Ct. App.) (same), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
968 (1979); see also Allen III, supra note 138, at 328-29 ("any evidence" standard
different from "raise a reasonable doubt" standard in that court need not determine
magnitude of persuasive effect of evidence under "any evidence" standard).
152. 379 A.2d 140 (Me. 1977).
153. Id. at 147 n.7; see, e.g., People v. Redmond, 59 Ill. 2d 328, 336-37, 320
N.E.2d 321, 326 (1974) (insanity); State v. Millett, 273 A.2d 504, 508 (Me. 1971)
(self-defense); State v. Johnson, 579 S.W.2d 771, 776 (Mo. Ct. App.) (insanity), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 968 (1979).
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logical of the three, as it is the obverse of the
standard seems the most
5 4
prosecution's burden.
The Supreme Court may have implicitly answered the question as
to which standard is proper in United States v. Bailey.' 55 In Bailey,
the defendant raised the defense of duress to a charge of escape from
federal custody. The Court held that the two essential elements of a
duress defense in the prison escape context are: 1) justification for the
initial escape, and 2) a good faith effort to return to custody as soon as
the duress loses its coercive force. 56 To enable the court to give the
must come forward
jury an instruction on this defense, the5 defendant
7
with evidence of both these elements.1
The defendants in Bailey testified to receiving beatings and threats
in their prison cellblock. This evidence was apparently enough to
justify their initial escape. As to their efforts to return to custody,
however, they made vague statements about the attempts of their
"people" to contact the FBI, and that these "people" had in turn told
them the FBI would kill them. Based on this evidence, the district
court refused to instruct the jury on duress, ruling that the defendants'
explanation did not justify their failure to surrender. 158 In upholding

154. The "raise a reasonable doubt" standard, much more so than the two lower
standards, presents the danger of the equivalent of a directed verdict. W. LaFave &
A. Scott, supra note 4, § 8, at 53; Allen III, supra note 138, at 329; Underwood,
supra note 38, at 1335; Note, The Evolving Use of Presumptions in the Criminal
Law: Sandstrom v. Montana, 41 Ohio St. L.J. 1145, 1156 (1980) [hereinafter cited as
Presumptions].The heavier the burden, the less likely it is that a defendant will meet
it; if the burden of production is not met, the jury will never hear the issue. The right
to a jury trial may thereby be violated. See U.S. Const. amend. VI; Ashford &
Risinger, supra note 127, at 175 n.21; Presumptions, supra, at 1156.
This constitutional problem with the burden of production has never been adequately fleshed out by the courts. The burden of production invariably rests on a
presumption. See id. at 1155. For example, the elements of conspiracy are agreement, overt act and individual membership. See United States v. Read, 658 F.2d
1225, 1232 (7th Cir. 1981). In addition, the conspiracy presumptively continues as to
each member, unless rebutted by evidence of withdrawal. Hyde v. United States, 225
U.S. 347, 369 (1912). Assuming that only the burden of production rests on the
defendant, if he fails to meet his burden, the presumption holds, the jury never hears
about withdrawal, and a verdict, in effect, has been directed on the element of
continued membership. See Allen III, supra note 138, at 329.
Thus far, however, no such presumption has been stricken as unconstitutional.
Jeffries & Stephan, supra note 71, at 1334 n.14; Presumptions, supra, at 1155.
Indeed, commentators see such presumptions as "an economical way to screen out
Accordingly, there appears to be a consenissues extraneous to the case at hand ....
sus that shifting the burden of production is a permissible housekeeping device."
Jeffries & Stephan, supra note 71, at 1334; see Underwood, supra note 38, at 133536.
155. 444 U.S. 394 (1980).
156. Id. at 412-13.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 399-400.
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their convictions, the Supreme Court stated: "Vague and necessarily
self-serving statements of defendants or witnesses as to future good
intentions or ambiguous conduct simply do not support a finding of
this element of the defense."'15 9
This is certainly not the "any evidence" or "more than a scintilla"
standard. The Bailey Court required a threshold amount of credibility
for the satisfaction of the burden of production. Not only must the
defendant present evidence on all the elements of his defense, but also
his evidence must be more than "vague and self-serving." 1 0 The
Court seemed quite concerned about "the need to husband the resources necessary for [a jury trial] by limiting evidence in a trial to
that directed at the elements of the crime or at affirmative defenses." 16 ' The Court asserted that the high standard would not usurp
the jury's role as the arbiter of credibility, and stated that if the
defendant's evidence of one element of a defense is "insufficient to
sustain it even if believed, the trial court and jury need not be burdened" with evidence of the other elements. 62 Thus, Bailey ifiaplies
strongly that nothing less than the "raise a reasonable doubt" standard
is acceptable.
B. Withdrawal: How Much Evidence?
Hyde and Read place on the defendant the burden of production on
the issue of withdrawal. But neither case provides guidance as to
which of the three standards is proper. One early case, however, cited
in Read, does suggest a standard. In Mansfield v. United States,'16 3 the
trial court had instructed the jury that in order to find that the
defendant had made an effective withdrawal, "there must be a doubt
as to whether or not he remained in [the conspiracy].' 64 The Eighth
Circuit upheld this instruction:
The instruction given by the court, when considered as a whole,
falls fairly within the law as announced by the Supreme Court [in
Hyde]. There must be definite proof of withdrawal, some affirmative step must be taken .... The instruction, in substance, required the jury to find some evidence that would create a doubt in
their minds as to whether or not the appellants remained in the
scheme .... It does not relieve the government of the burden of
establishing their guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.'65

159. Id. at 415 (footnote omitted).
160. Id. at 416.

161. Id.
162.
163.
164.
165.

Id.
76 F.2d 224 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 601 (1935).
Id. at 229.
Id. at 229-30 (emphasis added).
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The defendant in Mansfield used his bond and mortgage company
to perpetrate a stock fraud on the public. The only evidence he offered
was that he "withdrew" by moving his office to a new building. 66 It
seems that this less-than-probative evidence was sufficient to meet the
burden of production, as the instruction was given, but apparently, in
light of the conviction, the prosecution's evidence that the defendant
had actively engaged in stock fraud until he was indicted, removed
any doubt that the defendant's evidence may have generated. 6 7 The
Mansfield court adopted the "raise a reasonable doubt" standard, but
not in a very stringent form. 168 Given Bailey, this is the standard to be
followed. A defendant in a conspiracy case would thus have to produce evidence bearing on all the elements of withdrawal: activity
inconsistent with the conspiracy (including communication to coconspirators or police), good faith and abandonment of the plot. 169
Moreover, such evidence must be sufficiently credible to raise a reasonable doubt.
C. A Special Constitutional Concern
In the context of the withdrawal defense, one important constitutional objection generally arises17 0 in requiring the defendant to meet
the burden of production-the inevitable infringement of the privilege against self-incrimination.17 ' This could occur with any defense;
often a defendant's only evidence is his own testimony. But it is a
particularly serious problem with the withdrawal defense.
Let us suppose again a conspiracy to rob a bank among A, B and C.
A makes an effective withdrawal; B and C rob the bank and kill a
teller. All three are indicted for conspiracy, robbery and murder. At

166. Id. at 230.
167. Id.
168. See Buhler v. United States, 33 F.2d 382, 385 (9th Cir. 1929) (court placed
the burden of disproving the defense on the prosecution, but did not discuss the
production burden).
169. See, e.g., United States v. Jimenez, 622 F.2d 753, 757 (5th Cir. 1980); United
States v. Bastone, 526 F.2d 971, 988 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 973
(1976); Piquett v. United States, 81 F.2d 75, 81 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 664
(1936).
170. In the context of withdrawal as a complete defense-either when coupled
with the statute of limitations or when effected before the first overt act-the
problem of self-incrimination does not arise. The defendant in either of those situations disclaims all guilt, whereas if he claims withdrawal as a partial defense, he
admits guilt to the conspiracy charge.
171. See Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398, 432-33 (1970) (Black, J., dissenting); United States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63, 87-88 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting);
Ashford & Risinger, supra note 127, at 176-77. But see Jeffries & Stephan, supra note
71, at 1334 n.15 (noting that the Supreme Court has "consistently rejected this
position").
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trial B and C do not take the stand, invoking their fifth amendment
rights. A's only evidence of withdrawal, then, is his own testimony
that he informed B and C of his withdrawal, and his non-participation in the substantive
crimes, which by itself is not enough to estab72
lish withdrawal. 1
A is faced with a Hobson's choice: He can choose not to testify and
hope to be acquitted of all three charges, or he can take the stand,
admit his participation in the conspiracy (making conviction on that
charge certain) and claim withdrawal. He is damned either way if the
evidence of his original participation is strong. He is especially
is
damned if he says nothing, because once his original involvement
73
established, his guilt on the substantive charges is presumed.
The situation is different for either withdrawal coupled with the
statute of limitations or withdrawal effected prior to the overt act; the
defendant in those cases takes the stand to exonerate himself com-

172. This hypothetical postulates the worst situation for a conspiracy defendant
who wants to claim withdrawal. Naturally, if the defendant effects his withdrawal
by informing the police, he is assured additional testimony. It is submitted, however,
that this method of withdrawal would not be particularly popular-most defendants
would surely rather slip away quietly than implicate their confederates, endangering
themselves in the process. See United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S.
422, 464 (1978) (communication to co-conspirators or law enforcement officials
"impractical").
173. One way to solve the special problem posed by withdrawal as a partial
defense would be, of course, to strike down the presumption that membership is
continuous. Its validity has never been questioned, except by the court in Read in so
far as it shifts the ultimate burden of proof to the defendant. United States v. Read,
658 F.2d 1225, 1232-33 (7th Cir. 1981). The presumption of continuing membership
in a conspiracy is distinguishable from the conclusive presumption that a person
intends the consequences of his acts, which was struck down in Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979). See Ranney, Presumptions in Criminal Cases: A New
Look at an Old Problem, 41 Mont. L. Rev. 21, 27-28 (1980). See generally Presumptions, supra note 154, at 1145-63 (discussing Sandstrom in depth). This is because
liability for co-conspirators' crimes is not so much predicated on the presumption that
membership in a conspiracy is continuous as it is on the original agreement, a crime
in itself. If such membership, however, is an essential element which must be proven
beyond a reasonable doubt in order for the state to constitutionally punish the
defendant for co-conspirators' crimes, the presumption itself is unconstitutional. See
supra text accompanying notes 116-19.
Barring the applicability of Sandstrom, one could argue that the membership
presumption does not meet the "more likely than not" test established in Tot v.
United States, 319 U.S. 463 (1943) and Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969). Tot
struck down a presumption that a person in possession of a firearm had received it in
interstate commerce, 319 U.S. at 466-72, and Leary struck down a presumption that
a person in possession of illegally imported marijuana had knowledge of the illegal
importation. 395 U.S. at 29-54. This argument may be difficult to sustain for
conspiracy, in view of the fact that courts have long and universally held that a
conspiracy by its nature is continuous. Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347, 369
(1912); United States v. Kissel, 218 U.S. 601, 607 (1910).
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pletely. Conviction is by no means certain because while admitting to
the conspiracy, the defendant claims that his entire prosecution is
barred by the statute.
One procedural solution, although unusual, could solve the special
problem posed by withdrawal as a partial defense. Going back to the
hypothetical posed earlier, A, with the burden of production, was
caught in a dilemma. He could either not raise the withdrawal defense to which he was entitled and hope for an unlikely acquittal, or
he could take the stand and incriminate himself as to the conspiracy,
but at least meet his burden of producing evidence that negates his
membership at the time the substantive offenses were committed. One
procedural expedient could be separate trials: The defendant could
remain silent during the first trial on the conspiracy and substantive
charges. If he is acquitted, nothing more needs to be done. If he is
convicted, he should be entitled to another trial on the substantive
charges alone, at which he could assert his withdrawal defense.
The immediate objection to this arrangement is that it would take
too much time and expense to have another trial and impanel another
to a related and even more efficient
jury.174 That objection 17leads
5
procedure: bifurcation.
Bifurcation requires one trial in two parts. The jury would hear all
evidence bearing on the conspiracy and substantive charges, but the
174. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 2 ("These rules... shall be construed to secure simplicity in procedure, fairness in administration and the elimination of unjustifiable
expense and delay.").
175. The devices of separate trials and bifurcation have long been used in civil
law, particularly to separate the issues of liability and damages. See Weinstein,
Routine Bifurcation of Jury Negligence Trials: An Example of the Questionable Use
of Rule Making Power, 14 Vand. L. Rev. 831, 852-53 (1961) (approving of split trials
in special cases); Zeisel & Callahan, Split Trials and Time Saving: A Statistical
Analysis, 76 Harv. L. Rev. 1606, 1624 (1963) (concluding that separation of issues
will save about 18 % of the court's trial time); Committee on State Courts of Superior
Jurisdiction, Separate Trials of the Issues of Liability and Damagesin PersonalInjury
Actions, 20 Rec. A.B. City N.Y. 659, 665-66 (1965) (approving split trials but not
recommending their routine use).
The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provide that if a defendant is prejudiced
by joinder of offenses, the court "may order an election or separate trials of counts,
grant a severance of defendants or provide whatever other relief justice requires."
Fed. R. Crim. P. 14. In United States v. Bennett, 460 F.2d 872 (D.C. Cir. 1972), the
court granted bifurcation of the insanity defense and the merits of a sexual assault
case. The defendant in Bennett claimed insanity, and, in the alternative, also denied
committing the crime. The defendant asserted that the admission of his psychiatrist's
testimony concerning his admission of guilt during a psychiatric examination violated
his privilege against self-incrimination. The court noted that the testimony was
intended to bear only on the insanity issue, but that the jury considered it in their
determination of the merits. The defendant was thereby prejudiced, and the court
remanded for a bifurcated trial. Id. at 878-81; see Parman v. United States, 399 F.2d
559, 561 (D.C. Cir.) (bifurcation within the "broad discretion" of trial judge), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 858 (1968).
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defendant claiming withdrawal would testify only before the judge,
not only admitting to the conspiracy but also meeting the burden of
production on the withdrawal defense. In the jury's eyes, the defendant was exercising his fifth amendment right; the judge would instruct
them accordingly. 7 6 The judge would then instruct the jury as to
conspiracy, the Pinkerton rule, and the prosecution's burden to prove
the agreement, the overt act and individual membership beyond a
reasonable doubt. No instruction would be given on withdrawal. If
the defendant is acquitted the trial would end. If he is convicted, the
judge would ask the jury to stay, explaining why the defense was not
raised earlier and asking them to hear and decide upon the same
evidence he heard. Of course, the prosecution would have already
prepared its rebuttal; no new evidence need be presented on the
conspiracy charge itself, because the jury is now being asked to determine guilt of the substantive charges only. Time is thereby saved, and
the defendant has not been forced to confess to conspiracy.
This second step will take place only if the judge has decided that
the evidence presented met the defendant's burden of production. If it
did not, the second step is unnecessary. Of course, the latter is more
likely to happen under
the "raise a reasonable doubt" standard than
177
under the others.

CONCLUSION

Whither withdrawal now? So far, Read is the only modern case
putting the burden of disproving withdrawal on the prosecution,
thereby creating an upheaval in the Seventh Circuit the effects of
which have not yet been felt elsewhere. When they are, the procedural devices of shifting the burden of production and bifurcating the
trial will provide a well-balanced, efficient working standard to keep
intact all of the due process safeguards essential to the protection of
the innocent.
Linda Cantoni

176. See Bruno v. United States, 308 U.S. 287, 292-93 (1939) (defendant has right
to instruction on privilege against self-incrimination).
177. See supra note 154.

